Abstract-Wireless sensor networks have been used widely in many application fields, whereas such applications as battlefield information obtaining, disaster survivor rescuing, etc. need an immediate and fast route that is simultaneously secure and energy-efficient. In this paper, by constructing a neighbor table, we build a tree-structure route that can meet all the above requirements for the large-sized wireless sensor networks with only a resource-constrained sink node. Our proposed routing scheme has salient features: light overhead, quick formation, and immediate effectiveness. We also adopt some effective energy-conserving measures, such as data aggregation, node sleep, sink move and parent reselection, etc., to prolong the lifetime of wireless sensor networks. We show through experiments that our routing scheme can ensure adequately the security and energyefficiency of the route request message and the sensing data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have profound effects on military and civil applications such as target field imaging, intrusion detection, weather monitoring, security and tactical surveillance, distributed computing, detecting ambient conditions such as temperature, movement, sound, light, or the presence of certain objects, inventory control, and disaster management [1] . The routing protocol plays an important role and is the basis for many critical network services in the wireless sensor network. Routing protocols can address the problem of how to find a path from the source to the destination and finally take charge of data delivery. Creating an immediate and fast route can assist rescue operations by locating survivors, identifying risky areas, and making the rescue team more aware of the overall situation in a disaster area.
Although WSNs are used widely in many applications in military, ecological, and health-related areas, they have many characteristics that make them be very susceptible to malicious attacks. For example, the underlying wireless communication channels are open to everyone; the constrained resources of sensor nodes make it very unlikely to employ strong security mechanisms on a sensor platform; the networks are usually deployed in hostile environments such as military battlefields. Therefore, routing protocols for WSNs face many difficulties, such as energy constraints invite DoS attacks, memory and bandwidth constraints prevent using sophisticated routing protocols, compromised nodes may inject malicious messages or drop data traffic, and so on. If routing protocols fail under malicious attacks, the high layer applications also fail and the network becomes useless. Thus, how to design a good routing that can meet all types of specific requirements for WSNs is a huge challenge.
Though many routing protocols have been proposed for WSNs over the past few years [2] , most of them do not consider security and as thus are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Due to the limited battery life of a sensor node, any security mechanisms for WSNs must be made energy efficient. Specifically, the number of message transmissions and the amount of computations must be kept as low as possible. Meanwhile, the size of a sensor network should not be constrained by the storage and energy resources in each node. However, the present routing protocols that address the security issues cost too much in the node's energy consumption aspect and can not meet the aforementioned requirements. Our proposed routing scheme not only endures the security of the routing information, but also adopts many energyconserving measures to prolong efficiently the WSN's lifetime.
In WSNs, the goal of the secure routing protocol is to support confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability of route messages in presence of attacks. In this paper, we propose a fast and efficient route based on tree-structure for WSNs, which can adapt the large-sized WSNs with only a resource-constrained sink node. By using the node's individual key and the sink node's oneway hash chain to encrypt and verify the route request message, the security goal of the route protocol is realized. Simultaneously, the pairwise keys and the local broadcast keys are securely established during the route request process, and as thus the method can reduce greatly the communication overhead of each node. We use multiple paths to the sink node to tolerate all kinds of attacks launched by the adversary after compromising legitimate nodes. We cleverly design the neighbor table to maintain the route and to provide secure assurance for data transfer.
In the neighbor table, we define the relation between a node and its neighbor, by which the node can reselect its parent node and randomly choose one of its upstream nodes as the next hop of the redundant path for sensing data. In order to prolong the lifetime of WSNs, we adopt some effective energy-conserving measures to try to make the energy of all nodes be consumed averagely, such as data aggregation, node sleep, sink move, parent reselection, and so forth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss some related work. In Section III, we present the proposed secure and energy-efficient routing scheme and, in Section IV and V, we analyze the security and performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Whether in flat or hierarchical routing protocol, minimizing energy consumption is the most essential requirement for routing techniques in WSNs. For example, in directed diffusion [3] protocol that is a flat routing, data aggregation and in-network processing are required to reduce the number of transmissions of redundant data. In the low energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) [4] that is a hierarchical routing, the cluster head node performs more complicated operations such as data aggregation and long distance routing.
In order to improve the security of routing and defend against malicious attacks aimed at the routing for WSNs, some security countermeasures for routing protocols in WSNs have been presented. An extension of logical key hierarchy for WSN (LKHW) [5] is presented to protect the directed diffusion protocol [3] . In LKHW, a LKH is established before data are fused. Then the LKH is used to provide encryption and authentication for data fusion. Link-layer encryption and authentication by using a global key can protect WSNs against external attackers, because they do not know the global key. However, this does not protect against node compromise because the global key can be exposed. A trustful BS can detect spoofed node identities if every node shares a unique key with it, which is studied in SPINS [6] . However, the centralized control can introduce too much communication or management overhead.
Due to the resource constraints of sensor nodes and the constant rush of new classes of attacks, some malicious attacks can not be detected completely by the intrusion detection system (IDS) in WSNs. Ganesan et al propose a redundant routing approach for a sensor network [7] in order to provide reliable data dissemination. DPSP [8] provides a fast multi-path routing algorithm based on a novel heuristic that picks a set of highly reliable paths. In the INtrusion-tolerant routing protocol for wireless SEnsor NetworkS (INSENS) [9] , to increase the tolerance to node compromise, redundant multi-path routing is used so that traffic can survive even if some paths are compromised.
An attacker can exploit compromised nodes to launch many active attacks, such as Sinkhole attack, Wormhole attack, Sybil attack, node replication attack, rushing attack, selective forwarding attack, hello flooding attack, acknowledge spoofing attack, etc., to disrupt normal operations in a WSN, and these attacks are usually hard to prevent. Karlof and Wagner [10] analyze these attacks and present related countermeasures and design considerations for secure routing in WSNs.
III. SECURE AND ENERGY-EFFICIENT ROUTING
Our proposed routing scheme is mainly applied to the scenario where the sensor nodes do not move frequently, but it can also adapt the network topology changes by reconstructing the route. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can meet the requirement that there is only a resource-limited sink node in a large WSN. Although our proposed routing scheme is similar to the enhanced INSENS routing protocol, it has great improvement in security and energy-efficiency aspects of routing.
A. Route Building
After a wireless sensor network is deployed, the sink node securely broadcasts a route request message to the entire network, as shown in Fig. 1(a) . When a sensor node receives the route request message for the first time, it records the source node's ID in its neighbor table, meanwhile continues to broadcasts the packet, but in a modified form. Then the sender becomes the receiver's parent node, while the receiver is the sender's child node. However, when a node receives duplicate route request packets from the other neighbors except for the first sender, it only added the identifier of the sender to its neighbor table, and does not rebroadcast any duplicate packet. The route request message is delivered in turn by each intermediate node until it reaches the leaf node. As shown in Fig. 1(b) , node A, F, G, H, and I are leaf nodes. When these nodes broadcast the route request message, all their neighbors have already respective parent nodes, and as such they do not need to flood the route packet repeatedly. Finally, the route tree is quickly formed rooted in the sink node after all nodes have already flooded the route packet. From then on, each node may send or forward data packets in the reverse direction of the path along which the route packet has just gone.
To insure the stability of the data link, the node whose signal strength is less than pre-configured threshold can not be selected as a neighboring node by others. Meantime, this method can also ensure the symmetry of data link to some extent. In our routing scheme, we do not employ the link bidirectionality to counteract hello flood attack. However, a node won't store the relevant information of an adversary who has very sensitive radio into its neighbor table in our scheme.
B. Security Consideration
For ensuring data secure in the network, we exploit each node's individual key to protect the route request message, and exploit the pairwise key between both neighboring nodes to protect the sensing data packet. Before deployment, every sensor node is pre-distributed with a network-wide shared pseudo-random function f [11] and an initial key K I . Through them, every node can compute the individual key of any node in the network, which is used to combat outside attackers in the network initialization phase. For example, node E's individual key can be computed as follows:
Next, we take the sink node and nodes B, E and H as examples to illustrate the format of the route request message and demonstrate the establishment procedure of the neighbor table. First, the sink node floods the route request message, and then other nodes forward the route packet in turn as follows: 
In the sink node's route packet, there are not the two fields "Parent ID" and "Hops". We take node E as an example to explain the meaning of every field in the route request message, in which route denotes the route request message; ID e is the sender E's ID; E K e () denotes the encryption of the message with key K e ; SN OHC is the sink node's broadcast sequence number; SN e is node E's sequence number; K B e is node E's local broadcast key; ID b denotes that the sender E's parent node is node B; hop e is the number of hops from node E to the sink node; MAC K e denotes the computation of the message authentication code (MAC) of the route request message with key K e ; || is concatenation operator. According to (1), every receiving node can compute the sender's individual key (e.g., K e and K h ). After verifying MAC of the route request message correct, the receiving node decrypts the route packet with the sender's individual key. In order to protect the route request message against spoofing attack in which an adversary sends forged route request message, we leverage the concept of one-way proposed by µTESLA protocol [6] to identify the broadcast message. Before network deployment, we use a one-way function F to generate a sequence of numbers S 0 , S 1 , ..., S n , such that S i =F (S i+1 ), where 0≤i<n. SN OHC in (2) is S 1 that is broadcast by the sink node. Initially, every node is also preconfigured with a globally known one-way function F and an initial one-way hash chain number S 0 . Each node can authenticate whether the SN OHC originates from the sink node by verifying SN' OHC =F (SN OHC ) where SN' OHC is previous broadcast sequence number of the sink node. Since an intruder cannot predict the next SN OHC given the current SN OHC , it cannot arbitrarily inject forged route packets and flood the network.
The pairwise key and the sequence number between neighboring nodes, say node E and H, are computed as follows:
According to (3), the neighboring nodes can obtain the same pairwise key (e.g. K eh ) and sequence number (e.g. SN eh ). In order to prevent an adversary from obtaining all pairwise keys after getting K I in the same way as that in the LEAP protocol [12] , any pairwise key that is computed through using the pseudo-random function must be updated in time. Thus, a node will delete its neighbors' individual keys and sequence numbers, and the pseudorandom function f and the initial key K I after the pairwise keys shared with all the neighbors have been computed. Furthermore, this method can not only improve security of the pairwise key, but also save storage space of the node.
The aforementioned information is stored into the respective node's neighbor table, as shown in Table I . In order to counter Sybil attack and the node replication attack, we limit the number of neighbors for a node, i.e. the number of entries for the neighbor table, to a threshold. If the number of neighbors for a node reaches the threshold, then new neighbors will not be appended into its neighbor table. That is the node won't establish the pairwise keys with its new neighbors, and thus they cannot communicate each other. This measure can somewhat prevent the replicas of compromised nodes from joining the network in the form of mobile nodes.
For added security of the route request message, instead of using the individual key directly, each sensor node can derive a separate encryption key and a MAC key from the individual key [6] . This method is likewise applicable for the added security of data transmission.
As compared with INSENS protocol [9] , our proposed scheme does not adopt bidirectional authentication. Since adversaries can't be everywhere, and they can only exist in some areas, realizing uniformly the bidirectional authentication will affect the efficiency of the route and increase the delay of route formation. The hello packets broadcast periodically can also help to validate the existence of neighbors. Moreover, we can still ensure that sensing data can be correctly transferred to the sink node through the redundant path and packet loss rate threshold, etc.
C. Intrusion Tolerance with Multiple Paths
A sensor node broadcasts the route request message to its neighbors, with a modified message form where the sender's parent node and the number of hops to the sink node are included. For example, node E sends {B,E,2} to its neighboring nodes, node G sends {D,G,3} to its neighboring nodes. After hearing from other nodes, a sensor node builds its own neighbor table. Table I shows node E's neighbor table in the initial phase of network. According to the table, we define the relationship between the neighboring nodes. Besides parent and child nodes, we will define the concept of upstream, downstream and coordinative node. In order to clarify the concept, we choose an example node E, as shown in Fig. 1 and Table I . In E's neighbor set that excludes E's parent and child nodes, if a neighbor's parent does not belong to the set, then the neighbor is E's upstream node, e.g. A and C. If two nodes have a common parent, then they are each other's coordinative nodes. Moreover, the upstream node's child nodes are E's coordinate nodes, e.g. F. If a coordinate node has its child nodes in the set, then these child nodes are E's downstream nodes, e.g. G. Node F is also a classical example. For node F, nodes B, E, H are all its neighbors. Neither of E and H is F's upstream node, because their parents are both F's neighbors. However, B is F's upstream node, because its parent node Sink is not F's neighbor. Therefore, E is F's coordinate node, whereas H is F's downstream node.
When some sensor nodes are captured by adversaries and subsequently become insider attackers, they affected greatly the performance of the network. Besides desiring the intrusion detection system can discover the inside intruders, we employ the multiple paths to tolerate the intrusion. Multiple different paths are set up from each sensor node, so that even if an intruder compromises a node or a path, alternate forwarding paths exist still. In the proposed scheme, we only adopt two paths to deliver the sensing data, and according to different application requirements we may choose more redundant paths to deliver data. While transmitting sensing data packets, each sensor node uses two paths to tolerate possible intrusion. In addition to its parent, the sensor node selects randomly one of its upstream nodes as the next hop of the redundant path. However, while forwarding other nodes' data packets, each intermediate node only forwards these packets to its parent node. Therefore, our proposed scheme not only provides each data packet with redundant path, but also limits the copy of each data packet to only one. As shown in Fig. 1(c) , under the scenario where the node G, H and I have sensing data sent, they use two paths to transmit the sensing data, whereas the node D, E and F are the forwarding node without selecting the redundant path.
As compared with INSENS protocol with multiple resource-rich base stations, our scheme can also meet very well the large sensor networks with only single resourcelimited sink node.
D. Energy Efficiency Consideration
Targeting at the limited resource of a sensor node, we present a few saving-energy methods in our proposed scheme.
1) Data aggregation:
In order to eliminate the redundancy in the sensing data and reduce the communication cost and energy expenditure in data collection, the proposed scheme organizes sensor nodes into a tree hierarchy rooted at the sink as shown in Fig.  1(c) , in which the intermediate node acts as the aggregator fusing the data collected from its child nodes and downstream nodes before forwarding the results toward the sink. In this way, data are processed and fused at each hop on the way to the sink, and communication overhead can be largely reduced.
2) Parent reselection: When the energy value of a node changes greatly, it needs to flood its present energy value to all its neighbors, which is encrypted and authenticated with its local broadcast key. We set an energy reduction monitoring threshold. When the accumulation of energy reduction is beyond the threshold, the node advertises its present energy value and recounts the accumulation. The energy values of neighboring nodes are stored in every node's neighbor table, which is a criterion of reselecting the parent node. While meeting with the following condition, a node will update its parent node:
where v f is the energy value of the parent node; n is the number of neighbors; v i denotes the energy of any neighbor; v c is an experience constant and can ensure that a node does not change its parent frequently.
If the parent node's loss packet rate reaches the preset threshold, a node will also adjust its parent. This measure can also solve partly the issues of the asymmetry of the data link and counter the rushing attack and the selective forwarding attack.
A node selects one of its upstream nodes as the new parent node except for the sleeping ones. There are two methods of reselecting a parent node. One is choosing the node that has the smallest hops, but this method is susceptible to the sinkhole attack. The other is choosing randomly an upstream node. These two methods must ensure the new parent node meet with the following condition:
3) Sink move: Since data traffic must be concentrated towards the sink node, the sensor nodes around the sink have to forward data for other nodes whose number can be very large. This problem always exists regardless of what energy conserving protocol is used for data transmission. As a result, those bottleneck nodes around the sink node deplete their batteries much faster than other nodes. Luo et al showed that the mobile sink can obtain the improvement by about 500% in terms of network lifetime compared with the static sink [13] . In addition, the sink's move can also increase the difficulty that the adversaries obtain its exact position. Moreover, the updated route can adapt the dynamic topology changes through the sink's move. Thus, in our scheme, the sink node needs to move periodically. After the sink node moves to a new position by rule, it restarts the route request procedure at once. Then, other nodes flood the new route request messages from the sink as shown in Fig. 2(a) . For example, the node E enciphers and authenticates the route packet with its current local broadcast key K' B e to insure the confidentiality and authenticity of the new route request message. (6) where SN OHC is the current broadcast sequence number of the sink node, such that SN' OHC = F(SN OHC ), whereas SN' OHC is the previous broadcast sequence number of the sink; K B e is E's new local broadcast key, and is updated in every new route request period. As compared with (2), (6) omits E's sequence number SN e . Because the pairwise keys between the neighboring nodes have already existed, we do not need the node's sequence number to aid to compute the pairwise key, and as thus it is excluded from the new route request message. Compared with using the pairwise key, using the local broadcast key in (6) can greatly reduce the node's communication overhead.
4) Node sleep:
In order to prolong the lifetime of network, some redundant nodes should enter the sleep state. In our scheme, if a node has no child nodes, it will go to sleep. Because the sleeping period is very long, whether before or after sleeping, the node advertises to its neighbors. Thus, other nodes won't select a sleeping node as next hop on the redundant path. When a sleeping node with abundant energy wakes up, it is possibly chosen as the parent of some nodes. During sleeping period, a node can miss the reconstruction of the route. Therefore, when the sleeping node wakes up, each of its neighbors will exchange with it information changed, e.g. parent ID, hops, local broadcast key, new SN OHC , using an unicast packet encrypted and authenticated with the shared pairwise key. Thus, the sleeping node that missed the new route request procedure can still return to the network.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze our proposed routing scheme from preventing both general and special attacks on WSN routing.
A. Preventing General Attacks on WSN Routing
General attacks on WSN routing include mainly eavesdropping, spoofing, altering and replaying the routing information, and launching DoS (Denial of Service) attack to the nodes.
Whether in the route initial phase or in the route reconstructing phase, we use the node's individual key or local broadcast key to encrypt and authenticate the route message, and therefore the adversaries that do not know these keys can not obtain or tamper with the contents of the routing messages.
Due to the use of the neighbor table, the intruder can not launch the replay attack. As long as the sender is in the neighbor table, the duplicate route request message will be discarded.
In our scheme, one-way sequence number SN OHC can efficiently prevent an adversary from impersonating the sink node and flooding arbitrarily route request message.
According to (2) and (6), the route request message sent by every node can be authenticated, and moreover, these messages do not necessarily be fed back. Thus, our routing scheme can efficiently counteract the Dos attack.
B. Preventing Specific Attacks on WSN Routing
Specific attacks on WSN routing include mainly Sinkhole attack, Wormhole attack, rushing attack, Sybil attack, node replication attack, hello flooding attack, acknowledge spoofing attack, selectively forwarding attack, and so on [2, 10] .
In our routing scheme, a node only selects its parent node and one of its upstream nodes as the next hop of forwarding data. A malicious node advertises a high quality link to the sink node won't attract a lot of packets from other nodes, and as thus our routing scheme can deal with Sinkhole attack and Wormhole attack.
Every node needs to periodically broadcast "hello" to advertise itself. The sequence number and the pairwise key stored in the neighbor table can help to authenticate the hello packet and the acknowledge packet. As a result, an adversary who does not know the shared information cannot flood a lot of hello packets and forge acknowledge packets.
Targeting the selective forwarding attack, we adopt a measure similar to [14] , in which each sensor node can work under a promiscuous mode so that it can overhear the transmission of neighboring nodes. If one of neighbors of a suspected node finds that the number of packets that the suspected node fails to forward exceeds a certain threshold, the neighbor can collaborate with other neighbors to make a decision about the suspected node. In addition, multi-path routing and randomly picking next hop from upstream nodes can also help solve the selective forwarding problem.
According to (3), the usage of the pairwise keys decentralized completely between neighboring nodes can provide perfect security guarantee in the presence of compromised sensor nodes, which means that the compromise of some nodes does not leak any information about the shared keys between non-compromised nodes. Through limiting the number of neighbors for a node and authenticating all messages using the sequence number and the pairwise key, we can also prevent the intruder from launching Sybil attack, the rushing attack and the node replication attack to a certain extent. Additionally, we can use the multiple paths to the sink node to tolerate these attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We used MATLAB 7.9.0 to perform simulations in order to evaluate our routing scheme and compare it with related routing schemes. We also implemented our routing scheme on Crossbow's IRIS sensor nodes. We choose RC5 (with 12 rounds) as the block cipher to implement encryption/decryption algorithm, generate message authentication code (MAC), and verify one-way hash chain.
We evaluate the performance of our proposed routing scheme from four aspects including computation overhead, communication overhead, storage overhead and energy efficiency.
A. Computation Overhead
In route request phase, the computational overhead for each node includes the verification and decryption of the received route quest message, the encryption and authentication of the modified route packet, and the computation of the pseudo-random function and the oneway function. We have counted the time cost by these operations on an IRIS node for 20 times. The IRIS node runs TinyOS system, in which the default packet size is 36 bytes. Fig. 3 shows that these operations do not incur too much computational overhead. 
B. Communication Overhead
During the route request process, each node needs only to broadcast a route request packet and no reply message is required, so the communication overhead for each node is very low. Simultaneously, the pairwise key between two neighboring nodes and each node's local broadcast key are established. Therefore, these proposed mechanisms not only ensure the security of the route information but also decrease effectively the communication overhead of each node, as compared with other routing protocols. Moreover, the mechanism without any feedback also lowers the possibility of the DoS attack.
In the enhanced INSENS routing protocol, in order to defend against a rushing attack, each REQ message forwarded by a node is encrypted with a cluster key. Furthermore, the cluster key setup combined with the echo-back mechanism is performed prior to the arrival of REQ messages. where y represents x's any neighbor; nonce is a random number; K y,x is a random number generated by y as their pairwise key. Each node generates again a random number as the cluster key, and then unicasts it to all its verified neighbor nodes. Suppose the average number of neighbors of a node is m in a sensor network, each node in the enhanced INSENS protocol sends 2m+1 packets more than that in our scheme in the route request process. Therefore, the communication overhead for a node in the enhanced INSENS protocol is far greater than that of a node in our proposed scheme. Fig. 4 shows the comparison of communication overhead between our proposed scheme and the enhanced INSENS protocol in the route request process.
In our routing scheme, when transmitting sensing data packets, the sensing node uses the redundant paths; however, when forwarding other nodes' data packets, the intermediate node does not choose the redundant path. Thus, our routing scheme limits the number of replicas for each data packet, while the enhanced INSENS routing protocol with multiple base stations has not such limitation. Fig. 5 shows the comparison of the number of messages forwarded by nodes between two routing schemes. In Fig. 5 , we choose 4 redundant paths for our routing scheme, and choose 2 base stations for the enhanced INSENS routing protocol. From the figure we conclude that communication overhead in our scheme is far lower than the enhanced INSENS protocol along with the increase of hops in the data transfer phase. 
C. Storage Overhead
In our scheme, each node needs to store a neighbor table as shown in Table I , each row of which occupies 24 bytes. However, in INSENS protocol, before a node x destroys its global key, it generates a new key K x = MAC(global_key, ID x ), and a set of random numbers y 1 ,…,y k , where y i = MAC(global_key, r i ), and r 1 ,...,r k are random numbers. These data are used to set up keys with newly joining nodes. However, new nodes will bring the global key, which increases the possibility of the key leak. When new nodes are deployed for multiple times, this mechanism will not only compromise the security, but also it will consume lots of storage space of a node.
If we do not consider the new node joining situation, in INSENS protocol a node needs to store each neighbor's ID, pairwise key, local cluster key and nonce, size of which is 22 bytes in sum. Moreover, in the routing table a node needs to store each base station's ID and the corresponding parent ID, size of which is 4 bytes. Fig. 6 shows the comparison of storage overhead for a node between the proposed routing scheme and the enhanced INSENS routing protocol with the various number k of base stations. From the figure we may conclude that the storage overhead for a node in our scheme is similar to that of the enhanced INSENS routing protocol. 
D. Energy Saving
In the node's energy consumption aspect, we adopt many effective energy-conserving measures, e.g., sink move, node sleep, data aggregation, parent reselection, etc., which make the energy of all nodes be averagely consumed and as thus efficiently prolong the network lifetime.
Overall, we conclude that our scheme is more efficient in computation, communication, storage and energy and can be better fit for the resource-constrained wireless sensor networks as compared with other routing protocols.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we realized the intrusion-tolerant and energy-efficient routing in the large-sized wireless sensor networks with only single resource-limited sink node. There is a faint possibility that there exist multiple base stations in wireless sensor networks, and there is only a sink node in the most of WSNs. As compared with INSENS protocol with multiple base stations, our routing scheme can be better fit for the aforementioned scenario.
Analysis shows that the overhead of the whole routing scheme is very light, and the route can be securely and quickly built. Furthermore, the corresponding nodes can send sensing data as soon as part of the route is built. Additionally, our proposed scheme can dynamically adapt to the network topology change, e.g. new nodes' joining and old nodes' revocation, by reconstructing the route. Figure 1 . Secure and energy-efficient tree-structrued routing: (a) the sink node broadcasts a route request message to the entire network and the neighbor relationship of all nodes are established consecutively; (b) each node builds the route to the sink and forms its own neighbor table with the node relationship; (c) the nodes send sensing data using two paths. Figure 2 . Rerouting after the sink node changes its position: (a) the sink node rebroadcasts a route request message; (b) the route rebuilds and each node reclassifies its neighboring nodes and modifies its neighbor table; (c) the nodes send sensing data using two paths. 
